The hybrid state solution

 

Map of the two-state solution, from: Britannica

For years we have been hearing about the completely stalled negotiations for a two-state solution. The so-called one-state solution is therefore gaining more and more ground, but is that really an improvement? Neither solution seems ideal to me. In my current blog post I therefore argue for an alternative solution: the hybrid state solution. A solution based not on a perpetual negotiation framework, but on ongoing, UN enforcement of international law and peace. In that hybrid state solution, as I currently envision it, you will continue to have two national states, a state of Israel and a state of Palestine, but they themselves will fall under a limited but effective confederal UN regime, including the necessary military means to combat apartheid, to stop and prevent colonial oppression, ethnic cleansing and genocide.

In the Netherlands we've heard a lot of commotion in recent months about the statement 'from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free'. This statement should be regarded as anti-Semitic, because, or so the accusation goes, it denies Israel's right to exist if Palestine were to cover the entire territory from the river to the sea, which on balance would imply the ethnic cleansing of Jews.

Still, we see more and more pushback from the pro-Palestine movement on the qualification of this statement as anti-Semitic. The opposing view states that this statement is not anti-Semitic and does not imply ethnic cleansing of Jews, but instead strives for a democratic state with equal rights for everyone, where Jews and Arabs can live together in peace and security. Hence, a one-state solution, instead of a two-state solution.

If that is the intention behind that statement, then you cannot indeed speak of a call for ethnic cleansing. After all, the Jews may simply continue to live in that democratic state. Although the state of Israel is denied the right to exist, at the same time a democratic state for everyone is given in return. So the population itself does not lose its right to exist, only the state of Israel, which is replaced by another state. Not only living side by side in peace and security, but also living together: as an ideal that actually doesn't sound too bad at all. You can of course have your doubts about the feasibility or practicality of this and you can also have all sorts of other considerations about the one-state solution, but you cannot in good faith call the 'from the river to the sea' statement anti-Semitic, when it is made with this intention.

In addition to those who have the above-mentioned non-anti-Semitic intention, there are undoubtedly also a small group of people who do have an anti-Semitic intention. But that would have to become clear from the context or from other comments. Most people don't mean anything wrong by it: a lot of fuss about nothing. The statement in itself is not anti-Semitic and should therefore not be criminalized.

Yet you can still have a good faith criticism also of the non-anti-Semitic intention. By choosing Palestine as the name for this democratic state from the river to the sea, an impression is at least given that in that state the Palestinians would have won and the Israelis would have lost: after all, in that scenario the Palestinians would be allowed to put their desired name on that new state, the Israelis do not. Yes, this does justice to the victims of more than 100 years of colonialism, ethnic cleansing, apartheid oppression and you could also see it as a reversal of colonization, so you could perhaps say that it is and was simply Palestine, no matter how you look at it. Yet at the same time it cannot be denied that it would also be very painful for the Israelis to have to give up not only the state they now have, but also the name Israel: after all, their national identity is intimately intertwined with this word, just like the name Palestine is intimately intertwined with the national identity of the Palestinians. In addition, the Israelis have had their own state for 76 years, even though its creation was undoubtedly unjust. But that this state was without a doubt the unjust culmination of an extremely violent colonial project, which at that time could have been reversed, does not alter the fact that many generations of Israelis have now grown their own roots in the territory as well, even though this was (and is) certainly at the expense of the roots of the Palestinian people. This process of colonization has never ended and neither have the violence, apartheid and ethnic cleansing: one only has to look at the settlers in the West Bank and this point is immediately clear. And yes, the desire for a greater Israel is shared by more than half of Israelis: all of this makes it tempting to simply brush aside the needs and wants of Israelis as something completely irrelevant: 'you should have stayed away from Palestine, with your colonists; your wishes are irrelevant', is the implicit sentiment behind this. Although I understand this sentiment and do not think it is entirely unjustified, since colonialism, ethnic cleansing, and apartheid should never continue without consequences, although this has unfortunately happened and continues to happen, it is also a bit too simplistic. After all, you cannot equate every Israeli with the settlers. You cannot blame every Israeli child for the wrong choices of their (great-grand)parents, or even of their brothers or sisters, uncles or aunts. And even those who are guilty of wrongdoing themselves (and unfortunately there are a lot of them) still do not deserve to be subjected to a sentiment that does not take into account the needs and wants of the Israeli people or takes them into account with insufficient nuance. I will not blame anyone, especially not the Palestinians themselves, if they no longer have any nuance left to spare after the horrific massacres in the Gaza Strip in recent months, because Israel really has itself to blame for that. But as far as I am concerned, we cannot avoid also taking into account the needs and wants of the Israeli people, not just those of the Palestinian people. And in light of this, the statement 'from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free' is a bit too simplistic in my opinion, even though it doesn't have anti-Semitic intent.

It cannot be denied that the roots of the Palestinian people go back many more generations, many times deeper than those of most Israelis (with the exception of the 3% of Jews who already lived there peacefully with the Arabs during the time of the Ottoman Empire). But at the same time, the roots of the Israeli people that have slowly grown since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 cannot be denied either, no matter how much that 'taking root' was (and continues to be) inevitably and inherently accompanied by the violent uprooting (ethnic cleansing) of the indigenous population. Those roots are not nearly as strong as the religious claims of Zionists would have you believe, which point to the historical claims about the land of 2000 years ago, where their kings and prophets came from and which supposedly makes them "indigenous" and the Palestinians not, which of course is completely bonkers. But their roots are not completely absent either: they are just as old as the current state of Israel is young, nothing more, but also nothing less. These roots are still quite thin and weigh significantly less than the Palestinian ones, but are significant enough not to be completely ignored.

My position is that within the framework of a one-state solution it would therefore be more fair if that single democratic state were given a neutral name than if it were called Israel or Palestine. In other words: if you actually pursue a one-state solution with a single democratic, bi-national state in the context of a sincere quest for a peaceful, just solution (leaving aside all other objections you may reasonably have in this regard) and not because of the dominance of one nation over the other, then to be fair and consistent you should also grant that state a neutral name, for example South Levant or something like that. But not Israel or Palestine (although perhaps Israel-Palestine or Palestine-Israel, although this of course also raises difficult questions about the exact order of the two members of this connection, to which there are only two zero-sum answers).

Now imagine that we turn the slogan around: that is, we scrutinize those who want a greater Israel from the river to the sea. Then we immediately see the injustice of their desired one-state solution in the horrific crimes committed by the settlers in the West Bank. That is not just a hypothetical idea, but also literally what a large part of Israelis strive for and has even largely become a reality. And I'm not just talking about extremists like Ben Gevir, Smotrich and Netanyahu. 65% of Israelis are against the formation of a Palestinian state (https://news.gallup.com/poll/547760/life-israel-oct-charts.aspx). And only less than 2 percent of Israelis think the IDF is using too much firepower in Gaza, while almost 58 percent think they are using too little (I repeat: too little) firepower (https://truthout.org/articles/polls -show-broad-support-in-israel-for-gazas-destruction-and-starvation/)! The grotesque urge for expansion to incorporate everything into a greater Israel and to violently get rid of the indigenous population through settler colonialism, ethnic cleansing, massacres and the dehumanization of and lack of empathy for, or applauding, Palestinian civilian victims in Gaza and denying the distinction between Palestinian civilians and Hamas, go hand in hand. The idea that you can have a peaceful and secure greater Israel by oppressing the Palestinians, annexing their territory and denying their own Palestinian state is clearly an extremely reprehensible illusion, which is unfortunately very widely shared in Israel, and is frequently fed with genocidal sentiments that are not only widely shared on social media, but have even become commonplace on mainstream television channels.

I certainly do not want to accuse the idea that you could have a one-state solution with a peaceful democratic state called Palestine as having anti-Semitic or other harmful intentions, but Israelis will nevertheless understandably regard the idea with a similar distrust (and I express myself cautiously!) as the idea that the Palestinians would be treated equally, as long as they accepted that they would fall under a larger Israel. Even though the wish for a Palestine from the river to the sea is, as far as I am concerned, a lot less unjust than the wish for a greater Israel, since the Palestinians are victims of colonial oppression and ethnic cleansing and are entitled to compensation for the suffering that was inflicted upon to them, this does not alter the fact that the trust of the Israelis towards such an overarching Palestinian state would be completely nil. Many Israelis would violently oppose such a state. And that is certainly not entirely beyond comprehension.

So even those who believe that the most just solution would be to call this state from the river to the sea Palestine (with which I myself disagree), cannot escape the conclusion that this would of course never accepted by the Israelis themselves, and would therefore inevitably lead to more violent resistance, which would in any case not lead to a peaceful solution. And if this resistance were also to be combated by means of violent repression, this would of course lead to an even more unjust situation, probably even to an unprecedented orgy of violence, which of course can never be a good foundation for lasting peace, any way you slice it.

However, it is understandable that, despite these practical objections, many with a pro-Palestinian opinion, including myself, would want to choose Palestine as the name for a state for the Palestinians: otherwise you would de facto erase a crucial pillar of the rich Palestinian culture. The name Palestine is not just a name. That name harbors a rich culture, a way of life. A one-state solution with a neutral name such as South Levant may pose a lower risk of violence than a one-state solution with the name Palestine or Israel (although in my opinion this would still lead to a lot of violence and would also be impracticable), but there is also the great risk that Palestinian and Israeli culture will ultimately be diluted at the same time. And you shouldn't want that either.

This last argument about not wanting to dilute a culture may seem suspiciously similar to a right-wing, pro-nationalist position, which, for example, leads to intolerance in our own country. Yes, perhaps it even seems a bit like a pro-'ethnic cleansing' position, to keep cultures separate instead of bringing them together in a bi-national melting pot? However, I don't think this is the case. My only concern is that where a people derive their dignity from a certain bond with their country, we should not undermine this by undermining the conditions of that dignity. It is up to the inhabitants of a country to decide whether they want to open themselves up to or are ready for a more multicultural, multi-national or bi-national society, or not. As I now see it, but I could be wrong, it is not the case with Palestinian and Israeli culture that they are open to this at this moment in time and there is nothing wrong with that. So I maintain the position that in 2024, a dilution of Palestinian or Israeli culture into a cultural melting pot would be undesirable (but perhaps that situation could be different in 50 or 100 years from now, who knows.)

In short, choices have to be made. After all, either you keep the name Palestine and apply it to the Palestinian part of a two-state solution (i.e. not: from the river to the sea), or you accept a neutral name for a one-state solution. But since you should not want to erase the name Palestine or Israel in 2024 or dissolve it into a larger whole, the choice for a two-state solution seems obvious. After all, there is no other alternative, right? And we have seen that a one-state solution will not work anyway.

Yet the two-state solution itself is also not without problems:

1. The failure of the long-term peace process since the Oslo Accords is often mentioned. The hope or suggestion of a two-state solution, without actually promising one, was deliberately dangled in front of the Palestinians in Gaza, East Jerusalem and the West Bank in the early 1990s, but nothing substantial ever came out of this. Ultimately, this is all about American hegemony, with specific American-Israeli interests in the Middle East taking center stage. Those negotiations have turned out to be a farce and are taking an interminable amount of time. It ensures that Israel can get away with even more colonialism, apartheid and even more oppression, while Palestinians have to make more and more concessions. There is accountability for Palestinians, but the Israelis just get away with everything.

The problem with a two-state solution is that it can only be achieved through a negotiating framework. After all, two sovereign parties must reach an agreement through negotiations and jointly conclude a deal. The fairness of that process is undermined when there is an unbalanced power relationship between Israel and Palestine, as a result of which one party holds all the cards and the other party always has to make concessions. In addition, the US is trying to promote Israel's interests and the US is deliberately delaying any kind of deal so that, on balance, Israel can continue the occupation indefinitely. As long as this negotiating framework remains leading and as long as the US is the hegemon that always holds sway, not much seems to change.

This problem could perhaps be partly mitigated if the negotiations were led by the UN (and not by the Security Council, but by a delegation under the supervision of the General Assembly), instead of by the US. It remains to be seen whether the US would allow that to happen. But in any case, this does not alter the fact that the unbalanced power relationship will remain a major obstacle to achieving an effective and just solution through a negotiating framework.

In a one-state solution it is somewhat easier to imagine how the negotiating framework between two sovereign parties does not necessarily have to be sacred and can be abandoned where necessary and that the line set out by the international community can be followed more closely, since in that vision both states will eventually have to be replaced by one state. The one-state solution may therefore seem a slightly more attractive option in this respect to regain some traction in a completely failed 'peace process' on the way to a 'two-state solution'. In any case, it's a different tune.

2. Furthermore, the difficulty of a fragmented West Bank is also often referred to. Since the Oslo Accords, the annexation of Palestinian occupied territory, the number of settlers and settlements has increased dramatically and settlers have frequently enshrined those annexations in Israeli law, which directly contradicts international law.

The question is: if that two-state solution ultimately comes about, how will those settlers live peacefully with the Palestinians in the new Palestinian state? Is that even possible in a completely fragmented patchwork, where the number of Palestinian areas has become increasingly smaller, increasingly encroached upon by settlers? Won't this lead to the forced relocation of a large number of settlers? And isn't that itself a form of ethnic cleansing?

These questions are indeed difficult to answer within the framework of the two-state solution.

In a one-state solution it is much easier to say that it does not matter where you live, as everyone is basically welcome to the same extent, regardless of nationality. In that respect, the one-state solution seems - at first glance - to have an advantage on this point. Yet I would like to say about this: appearances are deceiving, see the next point.

3. How do you ensure stability of the two-state solution? How do you ensure that those who time and again abuse their power to violently bend the world to their will do not gain the upper hand? How do you ensure that both parties adhere to the agreements?

This is also a difficult point in a two-state solution. After all: both states are sovereign parties, which can decide at any given time to unilaterally withdraw from a deal. That makes the risk that everything will eventually go wrong again is quite high.

Once a one-state solution has become a reality, it no longer suffers from the issue of both parties being sovereign and therefore being able to unilaterally withdraw from the deal, because in that solution only 1 state is sovereign and could theoretically be firmly in control.

Yet the one-state solution faces an even greater threat to stability than the two-state solution. Precisely by bringing Israelis and Palestinians so close together at this moment in time, while feelings of hatred are still so terribly strong and the need for the unilateral triumph of one's own national identity by wanting to attach the name Israel or Palestine to that state, the the risk of violence increases very significantly. That vision of living together in peace and security in a democratic state would be wonderful in itself, but in practice it is certainly still a utopia for the time being.

4. How do you ensure that apartheid within the State of Israel is tackled? When you create a Palestinian state you probably solve the problem of apartheid in the former occupied Palestinian territories. However, there is also a section of Palestinians who live in Israel and they are currently also oppressed by the apartheid regime, although this is often less clearly visible. How do you ensure that you do not forget them with the creation of a Palestinian state? Since there is also a sovereign Israeli state, the international community has little control over how to solve and/or prevent this problem in the State of Israel itself.

This problem is much easier to solve within a one-state solution. You ensure that the same laws and rules apply to everyone throughout that single state, regardless of nationality. The one-state solution really has an advantage on this point.

We have seen that the two-state solution faces several major problems, causing it to encounter increasing resistance and many therefore opt, in turn, for a one-state solution again. But that one-state solution itself encounters even greater problems and, as far as I am concerned, is still a utopia, especially in 2024. Although I would prefer a two-state solution if you could only choose between a one-state solution and a two-state solution, I am quite willing to acknowledge that this solution is not the best in all respects: in some respects a one-state solution is actually better. It is therefore wise to carefully consider again whether these are indeed the only two options, or would it perhaps also be possible to discuss an alternative solution that could perhaps strike a better balance in terms of advantages and disadvantages? Couldn't some sort of intermediate form be possible? Some kind of hybrid state solution?

I think that this alternative, hybrid state solution is indeed possible: this is a solution that is not based on a perpetual negotiating framework, but on an ongoing, UN enforcement of international law and peace.

This conclusion is partly inspired by the perception that military intervention from the outside (and therefore also a necessary restriction of autonomy) by a UN peacekeeping force in the current genocide in Gaza is a necessary and inevitable step to put a stop to this genocide, since Israel would never willingly agree to this (they call it a "non-starter") unless 'Hamas' (read: the Gaza Strip) is completely destroyed, despite desperate American attempts to convince us otherwise, while they in fact give a license to not have to agree to anything at all and to simply continue with the genocide with impunity, and then blame Hamas (which is open to a deal) for its failure (with Anthony Blinken's lies such as "it was an Israeli deal", "Israel already accepted", "it's all on Hamas now", bla bla bla, so much for the American 'peace deal'). In my opinion, a UN intervention is not only temporarily necessary, but must be continuous, more drastic and more comprehensive, since otherwise the genocide will simply continue as soon as the peace force leaves again and otherwise there will be no end to the genocide and besides the resumption of the genocide, also no end to colonial oppression and/or apartheid. That is why much more is needed than just a temporary military intervention by a UN peacekeeping force.

In the hybrid state solution as I envision it, you continue to have two national states, a state of Israel and a state of Palestine, but they themselves fall under a supranational, confederal regime, under the flag of the UN.

This confederal regime is not a state, but rather a kind of 'framework regime' that only sets limits on what the two underlying states may or may not do, without significantly undermining the autonomy of those states. A bit similar to how the European Union relates to the European member states, yet more limited in scope, but more decisive. In my view, this regime only has the limited mandate to assess legislation, ad hoc (military, enforcement-related) or legal decisions and related acts of institutions from the states of Israel and Palestine, according to international law and the applicable agreements for long-term peace in the region. To this end, this confederal regime has the right to declare national legislation unlawful, for example if it maintains apartheid, or to introduce amendments to national laws that remove the elements of apartheid from the legislation in question. Every law originating from Israel and Palestine must therefore first be tested before it goes into effect. In addition, decisions regarding the use of military force or police force must always be examined and continuously audited by the confederal regime and sanctions are imposed if necessary. The confederal regime has the right to introduce legislation and to direct the deployment of its own soldiers or blue helmets and/or its own police force, but only to enforce international law and achieve lasting peace. The confederal regime therefore has no right to prevent, introduce or amend legislation with regard to, for example, education or health care, unless it contains elements of, for example, apartheid or discrimination. However, it will be possible to challenge legal decisions by national or regional courts from Israel and Palestine in a confederal court, so that everyone has the right to equal treatment under the law, in equal cases.

The regime's power is therefore very limited in scope and ensures that the autonomy of the state of Israel and Palestine is not unnecessarily violated, but that the autonomy of those two states is limited where that is really necessary. Although the scope of its power is very limited, its potential decisiveness and effectiveness is much greater, because it has its own army and police force, which makes effective intervention in enforcement immediately possible at any time, when there really is no other option. Although Israel and Palestine also have their own army and police force, the confederal regime also has far-reaching direct power over these institutions to restrict or adjust their armed power and/or powers and/or actions, where necessary to guarantee peace, security and international law. In that respect, the power of the confederal regime goes further than that of Europe in relation to its member states.

In my opinion, the hybrid state solution ensures that you can realistically achieve a situation in which there is no more apartheid, no colonial oppression, no ethnic cleansing, and no genocide.

In the first version of this blog post on the hybrid state solution, my idea was that the settlers did not all have to be forcibly removed from the West Bank and that some form of living together safefely under the security guarantees of the confederal regime would be possible. However, according to the ICJ advisory opinion on the 19th of July 2024 their current legal view is that "Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the regime associated with them, have been established and are being maintained in violation of international law". According to the court Israel must evacuate all existing settlements. This being the the most recent, authoritative and comprehensive legal view on the matter, we can now safely conclude that the removal of all settlers is not a matter of ethnic cleansing, but a necessary step to restore the rule of international law.

Furthermore, the fight against apartheid will also have to be accompanied by a 'softening' of national borders, through the gradual introduction of a 'free movement of persons and goods' law at the confederal level. This will not be possible from day one, but will only be possible once the worst tensions have subsided somewhat. Once (partially) introduced, this makes the inevitably high degree of ethnic 'mixing' in both states much less likely to ignite. For Palestinians it becomes much less a matter of being 'locked up' next to a hostile state, where you are not allowed to go. The 'soft' national borders also help to streamline a scheme for the right of return, as it is then slightly less impactful in which of the two states you end up.

A critical question you could ask about this confederal regime is: is it not very undemocratic to allow a regime established by the UN to exercise power over the sovereign states of Israel and Palestine? Doesn't that go against the right of Palestinians and Israelis to self-determination? Isn't that once again a kind of British Mandate, a kind of disguised colonialism? This is probably the strongest criticism you can have of my proposal for a hybrid state solution. Let me start by acknowledging that it is indeed undemocratic, and that I would much rather have seen a fully democratic solution, if that were possible. My idea here is that the UN General Assembly votes every four years on the composition of the confederal regime and continues to exercise independent supervision and can intervene where necessary. In addition, I think it is important that part of the confederal regime there is a joint parliament with elected representatives from Israel and Palestine, who have only a limited range of parliamentary powers (so no full legislative power) to be able to exercise a (limited) degree of influence and control over the executive power of the confederal regime and to propose legislation, but above all to form an indispensable public sounding board for the impact of decisions 'on the ground' and the often conflicting interests involved, so that they can prevent the confederal regime from behaving in complete  disregard for Israeli and/or Palestinian interests. Of course, all this neither makes it democratic, nor do I want pretend that it does, but it does provide a certain degree of supervision and legitimate checks and balances that are necessary to prevent or at least mitigate corruption in the confederal regime. Unfortunately, a solution to the current situation simply cannot be one hundred percent democratic.

An existing proposal for a fully voluntary, democratic variant of such a confederal solution is being discussed in below mentioned paper. I therefore do not claim to be the first to have proposed a confederal solution, although I did independently arrive at the particular solution I proposed here, without being aware in advance of the existence of this other confederal solution. But the following paper does deviate from the confederal regime I proposed, if you look at its voluntary democratic nature: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-state-plus-framework-a-confederal- solution-for-israel-palestine/

In itself, that democratic variant sounds very nice, but the chance that Israel would voluntarily agree to a solution that de facto means the end of apartheid and grants the Palestinians their own state seems negligible to me, to be honest. If we continue to fully respect Israel's sovereignty, there will be no end to apartheid, colonialism and the Palestinians will never have their own state. In short, unfortunately that sovereignty will have to be reined in to some extent, assuming that the Israelis will not voluntarily agree to the hybrid state solution proposed in this argument in 2024, which seems to me a certainty, given the resistance that Israel has shown time and time again against any peaceful solution.

In the case of the Palestinians in general and Hamas in particular, it is not entirely clear to me in advance, whether they will adhere to the conditions for peace or international law. Yet I am quite optimistic about that, because they will finally get what they have been entitled to for so long, namely a full-fledged and largely sovereign Palestinian state, but I am aware that with this optimism I do not represent the majority of the opinions in the world and the risk that Hamas might perhaps still continue to fire rockets seems to me, to be honest, not completely negligible either (and of course you want to prevent that). But as long as the Palestinians adhere to it of their own accord, which I expect, they will experience little infringement of their sovereignty (apart from, for example, declaring discriminatory legislation on homosexuality illegal) and they can pursue their own state building activities fairly undisturbed, allowing them to continue to build a state under the safe conditions that would have been impossible without that hybrid state solution, so I think the Palestinians could live with it just fine. And provided that Hamas indeed adheres to international law and peace agreements, Hamas may also come and/or remain in power through free and fair elections (which the confederal regime supervises and enforces), if the Palestinian people so choose. If they do not comply, they will face various types of sanctions (of course without collectively punishing the civilian population). A very drastic sanction could mean impeachment (which also counts for every Israeli government), but it does not have to come to that: again, I expect that Hamas will simply adhere to it. In any case, from a practical point of view, the restrictions on sovereignty cannot only apply to one side, without the international support for such a hybrid state solution being completely lost, which would mean that we would be even further away from where we need to be. Therefore, those restrictions should apply equally to both States.

Furthermore, I certainly do not rule out that the sovereignty that has been limited by the UN in the confederal regime can ultimately be returned step by step to the member states Israel and Palestine and that the confederal parliament could really become a democratic, legislative power from which the confederal regime is elected, although it will probably be many decades before tensions have subsided sufficiently in order to take such a major risk. The hybrid solution may initially be undemocratic, but it is also relatively easy to democratize when the time for that has arrived and they have already been able to get used to certain aspects of this for some time.

Yet the following objection still remains: how do we prevent the confederal regime from becoming bogged down in a kind of colonialism again? The honest answer is that we cannot prevent this with certainty. This risk therefore always remains. But that risk must also be weighed against the certainty that apartheid, colonialism, etc. will not stop if we do not dare to infringe on sovereignty. So as long as we can keep that risk low enough, by mitigating it, then that would be my preference. I think this could be done by transferring supervision of the confederal regime to the UN General Assembly and not to the Security Council. Because the US, with its veto power, has successfully managed to turn the Security Council into an imperialist instrument of its own power, by making it powerless when it wants to and by pushing it to adopt their own agenda, their 'pax americana', as soon as they don't use their veto power for once. And such a pernicious, dominant role for the US must be prevented at all costs, because they will undoubtedly abuse it to safeguard their own American-Israeli interests in the region. It must therefore emerge from and be supported by the international community in the broadest sense of the word, so not only by Western countries, but also by Arab countries and the Global South; the international community represented by the General Assembly. We cannot accept anything else and I do not support that either.

Furthermore, the question can be asked: can Israel continue to exist as a state at all? Has it not completely disqualified itself as some kind of rabid 'pitt bull regime' with its colonial oppression, apartheid, ethnic cleansing and genocide in the Gaza Strip and widespread genocidal rhetoric? To this I would answer that Israel can indeed no longer continue to exist as an apartheid state, as a state that supports colonial oppression, as a state that commits ethnic cleansing, nor as a state that commits genocide. The significant instruments of power that the confederal regime has at its disposal make me optimistic that it can go a long way in undoing and preventing all these completely undesirable facets of the current Israeli state. Genocidal feelings and expressions thereof in the private sphere cannot be prevented, but their expressions in public discourse can be effectively punished by the confederal court, as these are violations of the Genocide Convention. The confederal regime can in a sense be seen as a muzzle. That may not be the most politically correct, inspiring or hopeful metaphor, but it is the honest and bare reality of it. In any case, this muzzle does create the possibility that this society could eventually gradually be freed from the suffocating grip of its own rabid insanity, because it has a strong de-escalating effect. That creates at least a little hope that there may indeed be room for an Israeli society and state that can learn from its mistakes and gradually return to an atmosphere of normality. Hopefully one day there will be a state of Israel that of its own accord respects international law, which may also create space to really democratize the confederal regime, i.e. from the bottom up instead of from the top down, although we still have a long way to go. As far as I am concerned, the latter Israel does indeed have a right to exist, just like post-war Germany, for example, although we will first have to 'give this Israel a helping hand' so that it will first begin to come into existence, because in 2024, that Israel is still nowhere to be seen. So we first have to put on that muzzle!

Then the question remains: isn't the current position a conversion to the condamnable position called both-sidesism? I will of course let everyone draw their own conclusions, but I would dare say that this is not the case. I recognize in my argument above that colonial oppression has been coming from one side and that the current genocide in Gaza is not a 'war' or 'conflict'. So I certainly don't see myself as a member of the both-sides club. However, I will simply say that the final solution cannot be one side winning without taking into account the needs and wants of the other side, because above all this would be a guarantee that there will be no peace at all, and that a lot of misery will always remain, an ever-festering wound, from the river to the sea and around it. And I don't think anyone wants the latter outcome, whether you belong to the both-sides club or not.

In addition, there is another topic that I have not discussed in the context of the two-state solution above: that of the borders between a Palestinian state and the state of Israel. In the international community we see again and again that most states advocate to more or less maintain the borders that existed before June 1967, with some room for negotiations on the details. There appears to be a broad international consensus on this. This consensus ensures that an argument for specifically respecting these borders has a considerable advantage in terms of the support that can be expected from international law and the international community. That in itself makes it quite appealing to support that consensus, especially since international law has historically been the greatest ally of the Palestinian cause and that cause should of course not overplay its hand by asking for more than to which it is strictly entitled to in the eyes of the international community. Yet it must be said that I find the pre-June 1967 national borders for the Palestinians far too sparse. Not only are the Gaza Strip and the West Bank separated, but above all, the Gaza Strip is an embarrassingly, shamefully small piece of land. That simply needs to be allocated much more generously. And this can also be traced back to international law, because the 1967 annexation is not the only injustice against the Palestinians that must be addressed, but also the ethnic cleansing and land theft of 1947/1948. And yes, unfortunately we will have to open up that consensus just a little bit, but I simply cannot commit to a compromise that is so meager for a people who, after all, have historically been the victims here, again and again. In order to flourish again, the Gaza Strip will have to cover a much larger area, so that there is actually room for reconstruction, space to properly live your life: I sincerely hope that the international community will take note of this. In addition, there must be a Palestinian viaduct between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, so that they can actually form one state and one society in mutual solidarity, without the Israeli land underneath being enclosed again by a Palestinian land strip: the Israelis can then still pass under the viaduct without any problems. And this is simply feasible: the longest viaduct ever is 2.5 kilometers, so you only need to place 16 of these types of viaducts in a row and you have already bridged the required 40 kilometers.

Also, I'd like to give a warning. For the creation of a Palestinian state, the Palestinian Authority is all too often looked at as the logical representative of the Palestinians. However, over the years the PA has unfortunately behaved like a kind of corrupt Vichy government that actually primarily represents Israel's interests in order to line its own bureaucratic pockets. It is not up to the confederal regime to determine who can form the Palestinian government, because that should really be left to the democratic national elections within Palestine. However, the above-mentioned form of corruption cannot go unpunished and must be included in the mandate of the confederal regime and in the mandate of the confederal court, so that the Palestinian population can also be protected against this form of oppression. The hybrid state solution at least provides adequate instruments to properly address this.

A concluding remark is this. Although I believe the hybrid state solution is one that has a better chance of succeeding than the alternatives when you compare the pros and cons, I don't want to give the false impression that getting there is gonna be easy by any stretch of the imagination. Not least because convincing the world of an idea nobody even knows about is never easy. Also, avoiding a nefarious role of the US is indeed surely what is needed in theory, but getting there in practice is extremely difficult, because chances are slim anyone would be willing to try to rein in the power and influence of a hegemon or if they did, that anyone would succeed in doing so. So no, this isn't gonna be a walk in the park. So why the optimism in the above paragraphs? First, let me ask: if we can't even say what a peaceful solution would look like in theory, how are we going to get there in practise? That's why the kind of theoretical considerations above are not just useless pie in the skie thoughts, but absolutely necessary steps to at least envision a better future, so that we at least have a clearer understanding of what to aim for. My optimism is solely based on this: if the UN were to adopt the advice outlined above, there would be a good chance for lasting peace. But that's a pretty big if and we have to be realistic about the chances of that ever being realized, when the world doesn't even know about it: I won't deny that. But I will try my best to convince the world anyway. Although the scope of the current blogpost is merely to describe the ideal solution as I envision it, comparing the pros and cons, but not to provide a detailed plan with concrete practical steps on how to get there, I do want to say one thing about this. In that context lets remember what Frederick Douglas has said, "Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will". So we have to describe our demand as clearly and concretely as possible and that obviously can't mean we should start with demanding a complete hybrid solution all at once, but it does mean that we should start with something smaller, something more tangible: demand a UN military intervention NOW!